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HISTORICAL INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND CLAIMS:
A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE
COMMON LAW DOCTRINE ON INDIGENOUS TITLE
JÉRÉMIE GILBERT*
Abstract Within common law systems a body of jurisprudence has devel-
oped according to which indigenous peoples’ land rights have been recog-
nized based upon historical patterns of use and occupancy and corresponding
traditional land tenure. Looking at the emerging common law doctrine on
aboriginal or native title, this article examines how legal institutions are
building a theory on historical land claims through the recognition of indige-
nous laws deriving from prior occupation. The article analyses how the
common law doctrine builds a bridge between past events and contemporary
land claims. The aim of this article is to examine to what extent the common
law doctrine proposes a potential model for the development of a legal theory
on the issue of indigenous peoples’ historical land claims. In doing so the
article analyses how the common law doctrine compares with international
law when dealing with historical arguments by focusing on issues of
intertemporal law and extinguishment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption of the 1989 International Labour Organization Convention
169 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO 169),1 there has been
a growing focus on the rights of indigenous peoples under international law in
the past decades. The United Nations (UN) declared the decade 1994–2004 as
the first World Decade on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and 2005–2015 as
the second decade.2 In 2002, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was
established as an advisory body to the UN Economic and Social Council.3 In
June 2006, the recently established Human Rights Council adopted the text of
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for which adoption
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1 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No
169), reprinted in ILM 1382 (1989). Only two Commonwealth countries—Fiji and Dominica—
have ratified the Convention.
2 See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/163 (1994) and Resolution A/RES/59/174
(2005).
3 Economic and Social Council Resolution 2000/22.
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currently lies with the UN General Assembly.4 More generally, the rights of
indigenous peoples have generated an expanding jurisprudence from the UN
treaty monitoring bodies such as the Human Rights Committee or the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.5 Land rights have
been at the heart of indigenous peoples’ claims under international law.6
While a profound relationship with lands and territories characterizes indige-
nous groups, indigenous peoples have been and are repeatedly deprived of
their lands.7 Consequently, one common claim of indigenous peoples under
international law is the claim for the recognition of their right to ownership
and control over their territories.
Indigenous peoples have often been the victims of dispossession that took
place in the past. The question of land rights is often an issue of restoring lands
that were taken under a past discriminatory enterprise and linked to a continuing
denial of indigenous peoples’ rights. Moreover, indigenous peoples’ rights to
their lands derive from traditional occupation and indigenous laws and customs
relating to land ownership. Hence, the issue of land rights for indigenous peoples
is entrenched with historical elements, and from this perspective international
law is dealing with arguments of an historical nature. However, international
legal theory is limited when it comes to dealing with historical injustices.8 The
question of historical human rights violations and reparations for past wrongs is
an extremely underdeveloped part of international law.9 The weakness of inter-
national law in addressing the relationship between historical arguments and
contemporary land claims has some adverse consequences on the development
of indigenous peoples’ rights at the international level.10
Regarding indigenous peoples’ historical land rights, considerable devel-
opments have taken place under the jurisprudence of common law jurisdic-
tions in the last decades. These developments are based on the emergence of
a body of law which is referred to as aboriginal or/and native title doctrine,
with an expanding literature using notions such as ‘native title laws’.11 This
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4 See UN Doc A/HRC/1/L.10 (30 June 2006); and also UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56.
5 See P Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (MUP, Manchester, 2002); and J
Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (OUP, Oxford, 2004).
6 See J Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to
Actors (Transnational Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff, Ardsley, 2006)
7 See ‘Indigenous Peoples and their relationship to Land: Final working paper prepared by the
Special Rapporteur, Erica-Irene A. Daes’ UN Doc E/CN.4/SUB.2/2001/21.
8 See E Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2000).
9 See G Ulrich and L Krabbe Boserup (eds), Reparations: Redressing Past Wrongs, Human
Rights in Development Yearbook 2001 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003).
10 The most recent illustration includes the resolution proposed by the Third Committee of the
UN General Assembly deferring ‘consideration and action on the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’. See document A/C.3/61/L.57/Rev.1 (28 Nov 2006).
11 G Yunupingu (ed), Our Land is our Life, Land Rights, Past Present and Future (University
of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1997). See also P Patton, ‘The Translation of Indigenous Land into
Property: The Mere Analogy of English Jurisprudence’ (2000) 6 Parallax 25–38.
movement was mainly developed through the jurisprudence of both the
Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia in the 1990s.12
These two jurisdictions have established a legal doctrine labelled as ‘aborigi-
nal’ (Canada) or ‘native’ (Australia) title. As this article will examine the
reference to a common law doctrine of indigenous peoples’ land rights is grad-
ually becoming much more widespread, with national courts from Malaysia,
Belize, South Africa, Botswana, or Kenya referring to it. This doctrine recog-
nizes that those customary indigenous laws regarding land ownership which
preceded common law, should be recognized as title generating. In doing so
the common law doctrine raises fundamental issues about the legal repercus-
sions of the past. The recognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights through
the doctrine relies on the idea that the colonization of indigenous territories
has not completely ‘extinguished’ indigenous peoples’ land rights, as such
rights have ‘survived’ the colonial conquest. Therefore it recognizes indige-
nous peoples’ contemporary land rights based on historical arguments that
predated colonization.13 The objective of such recognition by national juris-
diction is ‘reconciliation’ between States and their indigenous populations.14
From this perspective the common law doctrine potentially offers an inter-
esting platform for the reconciliation between past dispossession and present-
day land claims. While the purpose itself is remarkable at a time when issues
of reparation for past wrongs are creating immense debate at the international
level,15 the doctrine raises some difficult issues regarding the development of
a legal framework on the interaction between historical wrongs and present-
day land claims. The present article engages this particular issue by compar-
ing the common law doctrine on indigenous peoples’ land rights with interna-
tional legal developments.
In exploring the relationship between the common law doctrine and inter-
national law the article wishes to analyse whether the common law doctrine
could be seen as an enlightened way of developing a legal theory on indige-
nous peoples’ historical land claims. To this purpose, the first part of the arti-
cle will analyse to what extent the different approaches undertaken by national
jurisdictions referring to the common law doctrine present some common
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12 This is also true for New Zealand. However, the situation remains particular as the recogni-
tion of native title is flowing from the existence of the Treaty of Waitangi. See Attorney-General
v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643, 2003 NZLR. See also US Supreme Court, Oneida Indian Nation
v Country of Oneida (1974) 414 US 661. In general, see K McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title
(OUP, Oxford, 1989).
13 A Reilly and A Genovese, ‘Claiming the Past: Historical Understanding in Australian Native
Title Jurisprudence (2004) 3 Indigenous Law Journal 19.
14 Looking at Canada, Australia and New Zealand McHugh refers to the emergence of a
‘jurisprudence of reconciliation’: PG McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law (OUP,
Oxford, 2004) 539–611. See also K McNeil, ‘Reconciliation and the Supreme Court: The
Opposing Views of Chief Justices Lamer and McLachlin’ (2003) 2 Indigenous Law Journal 1.
15 See J Miller and R Kumar (eds), Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries (OUP, Oxford,
2007).
features on the issue of historical land claims. Building on this analysis, the
second part of the article will examine how the common law doctrine proposes
some innovative legal theories on the relationship between historical events
and contemporary claims by recognizing indigenous customary systems of
law. The third part of the article will contrast the common law notion of extin-
guishment, which has been developed as a common law ‘solution’ to deal with
the past dispossession of indigenous peoples, to international human rights
standards on indigenous peoples’ rights. Finally, based on such analysis the
conclusion will examine whether the common law doctrine on indigenous
peoples’ land rights could serve as a potential source for the development of
international law on the issue of historical land claims.
II. TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINE: ON ‘INDIGENOUS TITLE’
Indigenous peoples’ land claims frequently come before the courts of Canada,
Australia or New Zealand, but have been less frequently litigated elsewhere.
However, with the recent growth of indigenous organizations in Asia and
Africa, we are witnessing the internationalization of indigenous claims. While
such developments often are seen only through the lens of national adjudication,
the national decisions on indigenous peoples’ land rights commonly depend on
a high level of comparative analysis. The following discussion examines to what
extent such development could indicate the emergence of a comprehensive
common law doctrine on indigenous peoples’ land rights, first by looking at its
geographical scope, and secondly, by analysing what are the common key
features of such doctrine within the different national jurisdictions.
A. The emergence of a common jurisprudence on ‘indigenous title’
Regarding indigenous peoples’ land rights, national jurisdictions in Australia,
Canada and New Zealand have developed a high level of comparative analy-
sis through a common law reference to aboriginal or native title.16 Hence, in
recent years, when addressing indigenous peoples’ land rights, there has been
a large focus on the jurisprudence emerging from these three countries.17
While the concept originated mainly from the jurisprudence of the High Court
of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada, recent decisions from other
national jurisdictions in other Commonwealth countries have referred to the
same concept as a common law reference. For example, in a case involving
some members of the Orang Asli community in Malaysia, the High Court of
Malaysia has recognized that indigenous peoples have specific rights to their
586 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
16 For references, see McNeil (n 12).
17 P Haveman (ed), Indigenous Peoples Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (OUP,
Oxford, 1999).
lands on the basis of the common law doctrine of native title.18 Referring to
leading cases on aboriginal title from Canada and Australia, the Malaysian
High Court affirmed that ‘native title’ is the right of the natives to live on their
land. The judge, Mokhtar Sidin JCA, applied such a right to the indigenous
peoples of Malaysia affirming the Orang Asli community’s common law right
to their lands. The judge stated:
I believe this is a common law right which the natives have and which the
Canadian and Australian courts have described as native title. I would agree that
in Malaysia the aborigines’ common law rights include, inter alia, the right to
live on their land as their forefathers had lived and this would mean that even the
future generations of the Aboriginal people would be entitled to this right.19
In this case, the judge also ruled that aboriginal common law rights coexist
with other national statutory rights guaranteeing indigenous peoples’ land
rights.20
Similar references to a common law doctrine on aboriginal or native title
have been made by several national jurisdictions. In Kenya, in a case at the
High Court, the Ogiek indigenous community has referred to decisions from
Australia on native title to argue for their rights to live on their traditional terri-
tories.21 In a case concerning indigenous peoples’ land rights in Belize, that
went to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, both the State and
the concerned indigenous peoples referred to the doctrine of aboriginal title as
applicable within the national context of Belize.22 The indigenous community
notably argued that as a former British colony ‘the common law of Belize
should be deemed to incorporate the common law doctrine that upholds the
property rights of indigenous peoples on the basis of customary land tenure,
referred to by common law courts as “aboriginal rights” or “title” ’.23 More
recently, references to the common law doctrine were also made in Botswana.
In December 2006, the High Court of Botswana ruled that the removal of the
Basarwa San community living in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve was
unlawful.24 Access to the reserve was restricted and the indigenous community
could no longer enter the land they had lived on and occupied for centuries.
This threatened their traditional lifestyle based on hunting and gathering. In this
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18 See Adong bin Kuwau v Kerajaan Negeri Johor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, [1998] 2 MLJ 158.
19 ibid 430.
20 On this issue see R Bulan, ‘Native Title as a Proprietary Right under the Constitution in
Peninsula Malaysia: A Step in the Right Direction?’ (2001) 9 Asia Pacific Law Review 83.
21 Republic of Kenya—In the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi Civil Case No 238 of 1999 (OS).
See also High Court at Nakuru, Moses Lesiamon Ole Mpoe v Commissioner Of Lands [2005].
22 Maya indigenous community of the Toledo District v Belize, Case 12.053, Report No 40/04,
Inter-Am CHR, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc 5 rev 1 at 727 (2004) para 107; and see the conclusion
of the Commission on this point, para 131.
23 ibid para 48.
24 High Court of Botswana, Roy Sesana and Ke/wa Setlohobogwa v The Attorney General,
Misca No 52 of 2002 (13 Dec 2006).
case, the indigenous community notably argued their right to remain on their
land based on their pre-existing rights recognized under common law. In its
decision, the High Court recognized that the indigenous community was
legally in possession of its lands. Interestingly, in reaching such conclusion,
one of the three judges, Justice Phumaphi, mentioned several precedents from
the Privy Council and the High Court of Australia referring to the common law
doctrine on ‘native title’, which were applicable in Botswana. Similar refer-
ences to the common law doctrine on aboriginal or native title have been
developed in ongoing litigations in Guyana25 and Cameroon.26
Regarding the propagation of the common law doctrine, another important
development took place in South Africa which possesses a pluralistic legal
system based on Roman-Dutch law and English common law.27 Following the
fall of the apartheid regime a crucial issue in South Africa was the question of
land restitution, as the previous racist regime was based on discriminatory land
distribution.28 As a result the post-apartheid government has put in place an
important piece of legislation, the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994
(which was amended in 1995 and 1996),29 dealing with land restitution. In a
long legal dispute that was settled in the Constitutional Court of South Africa,
the Richtersveld Community, an indigenous community, have been entitled to
claim land restitution under this act.30 During the proceedings the concerned
indigenous community relied on the doctrine of aboriginal title as part of the
common law of South Africa. In a primary decision, the Land Claims Court
rejected the application of the common law doctrine within South Africa.31 In
appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) decided that it was ‘unnecessary
to decide whether the doctrine forms part of our common law or whether
common law should be developed to recognise Aboriginal rights’.32 While the
majority of the judges refused to enter the debate on whether the aboriginal
title doctrine was applicable in South Africa, Vivier ADP relied on the
common law doctrine in his finding, and several references to cases dealing
with aboriginal/native title were made throughout the judgment. The Court
found that the Richtersveld Community’s customary right of ownership had
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25 See the case filed in 1998 by six leaders from the Akawaio and Arecuna communities, for
references: L Anselmo and F MacKay, Indigenous Peoples, Land Rights and Mining in the Upper
Mazaruni (Global Law Association, Tilburg, 1999).
26 For references, see The Bakweri Land Claims Committee (BLCC) v The Republic of
Cameroon (Case No 260/2002), African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
27 R Zimmermann and D Visser, Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996).
28 See V Jaichand, Restitution of Land Rights: A Workbook (Lex Patria, Johannesburg, 1997).
29 Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994—Act No 22 [as amended by Act No 84, 1995 and Act
No 78, 1996].
30 For an overview of the proceedings, see L Amena Hoq, ‘Land Restitution and the Doctrine
of Aboriginal Title: Ritchersveld Community v. Alexkor Ltd and Another’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 421.
31 For an illustration, see Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Limited and another LCC151/98
(22 March 2001), paras 44–8, 52.
32 The Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Limited and the Government of the Republic of
South Africa, Case No 488/2001, Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (24 Mar 2003).
survived the annexation by the British Crown, as ‘these rights constituted a
“customary law interest” and consequently a “right in land” . . .’33 Thus, even
though the doctrine of aboriginal/native title was not ‘imported’ as such, in
this case the concerned indigenous peoples had their right to land recognized
based on the exact same core principles on which the common law doctrine on
indigenous title is based; namely that the colonization of indigenous territories
did not amount to the full extinguishment of their rights, and that courts ought
to recognize indigenous customary laws as a source of land title. As Barry
highlights: ‘the finding of the SCA that the Richtersveld Community held a
customary interest at the time of annexation is very much akin to accepting the
doctrine of aboriginal or native title’.34
The application of the common law doctrine on aboriginal/native title was
also raised at the Constitutional Court level. The Constitutional Court pointed
out that although the Supreme Court had looked at the interrelationship between
common law and indigenous customs it was also necessary to appreciate such
interaction with the Constitution of South Africa. The Constitutional Court
affirmed that ‘like the common law, indigenous law is subject to any legislation,
consistent with the Constitution, that specifically deals with it. In result, indige-
nous law feeds into, nourishes, fuses with and becomes part of the amalgam of
South African law’.35 A crucial aspect of this decision from the South African
courts is the reference to civil law. As the South African legal system is based
on both Roman-Dutch law and English common law, it offers an interesting
approach to the common law theory of aboriginal/native title by showing how
such doctrine could be used outside a purely common law context, and, that
potentially indigenous title doctrine is not limited to common law countries.36
Hence, even though the courts of South Africa have refused to specifically use
the label ‘aboriginal/native’ title they have nonetheless integrated its main
features within the South African legal order.37
Overall, there have been different approaches to a common law doctrine on
indigenous peoples’ land rights. Some national jurisdictions like in Malaysia
have directly incorporated a common law doctrine whereas other jurisdictions
such as in South Africa have indirectly integrated some elements of the
common law doctrine. Despite these different approaches the decisions from
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Kenya, Belize, Botswana, and
South Africa, are reflecting a common position regarding indigenous peoples’
land rights. In their decisions, national courts have applied a high level of
comparative analysis referring to a similar common law approach. At the heart
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33 ibid para 8.
34 M Barry, ‘Now another Thing must Happen: Richtersveld and the Dilemmas of Land
Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 355, 368.
35 Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC0) para 51.
36 This point is also supported by decision regarding indigenous peoples’ land rights in
Québec, see R v Côté [1996] 3 SCR 139.
37 For a discussion on the implications/limits of such integration, see K Lehmann, ‘Aboriginal
Title, Indigenous Rights and the Right to Culture’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 86.
of such common denominator is the acknowledgment by national courts that
indigenous peoples’ land rights are grounded in their pre-existing customary
laws which have survived colonization. These different decisions from
national courts referring to a similar common law doctrine on indigenous
peoples’ land rights suggest the emergence of a unified jurisprudence on what
could be labelled as a doctrine on ‘indigenous title’: a combination of aborig-
inal (the Canadian label) and native title (the Australian label).
B. Common features of the common law doctrine
Aboriginal or native title is a right to land. It is a collective title under which
an indigenous community has the right to its use and occupation.38 The origins
of such doctrine can be found in early decisions from the Privy Council,39 and
19th century cases from the US Supreme Court.40 In terms of land law, within
the common law the source of indigenous title could be found in the doctrine
of ‘acquired rights’. Under this doctrine, a change in sovereignty (by conquest
or acquisition) does not affect the acquired property rights of the inhabitants.41
Under British colonial laws, when a conquest was made there were two
approaches to the effect of the acquisition of territory on the customary land
rights of the inhabitants. The first approach was based on the doctrine of conti-
nuity, which favoured the continuation of pre-existing customary land rights,
the idea being that conquest did not adversely affect these rights unless there
was an express legislative intent to do so. The second approach was based on
the doctrine of recognition. This doctrine affirmed that rights to land had to be
given formal recognition by the new power as annexation resulted in the aboli-
tion of all pre-existing rights.42 These rules on ‘acquired rights’ could be seen
as one of the sources of the contemporary doctrine on indigenous title. The
crucial point of the doctrine of aboriginal or native title is that the right to land
of indigenous communities has its source in the occupation of land prior to the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.43
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38 On the notion of exclusivity of such occupation, see High Court of Australia,
Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1.
39 St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber v The Queen (1889) 14 App Cas 46; Re Southern
Rhodesia [1919] AC 211.
40 Johnson and Braham’s Lessee v M’Intosh 21 US (8 Wheat) 1823; Cherokee Nation v
Georgia 30 US 1 (1830); Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (1832).
41 eg the US Supreme Court in the 1833 case of United States v Percheman affirmed that when
there is a change of sovereignty: ‘the people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient
sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their right to property, remain undis-
turbed’, United States v Percheman (1833) 7 Pet 6132 US, 87; see also: Certain Questions
Relating to Settlers of German Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany to Poland PCIJ Ser B
No 6 (10 Sept 1923).
42 See, eg, Vajesingji Joravarsingji v Secretary of State for India (1924) LR 51 Ind App 357.
43 See High Court of Australia, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1, paras 89 and
182; Supreme Court of Canada, R v Van der Peet 2 SCR (1996) 507, paras 18–19.
The doctrine on indigenous title relies on the common law rule that inter-
est in property which existed prior to the conquest of a territory by colonial
powers survives such conquest, unless such interest has been formally extin-
guished by legislation. The roots of indigenous title are to be found in the
indigenous customs and laws that preceded the acquisition of sovereignty by
colonizers. Thus, these titles are based on the recognition of pre-existing
indigenous laws, and on the common law principle that occupation is proof of
possession. One of the main sources of indigenous title is indigenous customs.
For example, in the 1992 groundbreaking Mabo case from the High Court of
Australia, Justice Brennan pointed out that ‘Native title has its origins in and
is given its content by the traditional laws and customs acknowledged by and
the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a terri-
tory’.44 Likewise, the Canadian approach remains based on the idea that
aboriginal title relies on pre-existing indigenous customs. Canadian courts
have affirmed that aboriginal title is sui generis as it based on both aboriginal
laws and common law as ‘Courts must not interpret Aboriginal rights using
conventional common law doctrines alone because of the continued existence
of prior Aboriginal legal regimes’.45 In South Africa, in the case of the
Richtersveld Community, the Supreme Court held that disputes as to the right
of an indigenous people to occupy traditional land are to be determined in the
first instance by reference to indigenous law, without importing English
concepts of property law.46 On the content and source of indigenous peoples’
land rights, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that: ‘[A]n interest in land
held under a system of indigenous law is thus expressly recognised as a “right
in land”, whether or not it was recognised by civil law as a legal right’.47 In
Malaysia, the Sabah and Sarawak High Court in Nor Anak Nyawai observed
that ‘the common law respects the pre-existing rights under native law or
custom’.48 Hence, for the High Court the existence of a title to the land for the
indigenous community does not depend on the existence of specific legislation
but is based on their pre-existing customary rights.49 Such recognition of pre-
existing indigenous customary land rights was also at the heart of the cases
from Kenya, Botswana, and Belize mentioned earlier. Overall, despite the
particularity of each national system, the different national jurisdictions have
affirmed that the existence of indigenous peoples’ rights to their land is to be
found in indigenous peoples’ own customary laws.
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44 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1, 58.
45 J Borrows and L Rotman, ‘The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does it make a
Difference?’ (1997) 36 Alta L Rev 9
46 The Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Limited and the Government of the Republic of
South Africa, Case No 488/2001, Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (24 Mar 2003).
47 ibid para 9.
48 Nor Anak Nyawai v Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 Current Law Journal
(Malaysia) 769.
49 See confirmation of such approach by the Court of Appeal in Kerajaan Negeri Selangor and
3 Ors v Sagong Bin Tasi and 6 Ors 2005 [CA].
As such, the doctrine on indigenous title implies recognition of the possi-
ble cohabitation of two systems of laws, common law and indigenous law,
within the same jurisdiction. As Pearson points out: ‘Native title is neither a
common law nor an Aboriginal law title but represents the recognition by the
common law of title under Aboriginal law’.50 For the first time in legal
history, under this doctrine, courts have recognized the legal value of indige-
nous customary systems of land tenure. As highlighted by the Supreme Court
of Canada, such recognition of indigenous customary laws is an attempt to
achieve reconciliation by giving the same weight to aboriginal laws and the
common law.51 In Van deer Pet, Chief Justice Lamer held that reconciliation
of the prior occupation of North America by aboriginal peoples with the asser-
tion of the Crown’s sovereignty required that account be taken of the ‘aborig-
inal perspective while at the same time taking into account the perspective of
the common law’; as he concluded, ‘true reconciliation will, equally, place
weight on each’.52 The doctrine could be seen as a bridge between indigenous
and non-indigenous cultures as the same weight is given to both systems of
law. From this perspective, the common law doctrine highlights the potential
coexistence of a cross-cultural title to land for indigenous peoples. This is
done from an historical perspective as indigenous title has its source in pre-
existing indigenous customs that predated the State legislation on property in
lands. Accordingly, the common law doctrine does establish a clear link
between dispossession that took place a long time ago and the present day situ-
ation. Thus, by putting the focus on pre-existing laws, the doctrine on indige-
nous title raises some issues regarding the timeframe of land occupation.
III. THE WEIGHT OF HISTORY: CONTINUOUS VIOLATIONS AND TRADITIONS
The common law doctrine on indigenous title reaches far back into history, as
indigenous peoples would have their right to land recognized in light of events
that took place centuries ago. Accordingly, the development of the doctrine
raises difficult questions regarding the link between law and history. One of
the first limitations on the relationship between law and history is the refer-
ence to the rule of intertemporal law. Under international law one of the funda-
mental legal difficulties when dealing with historical arguments is the
reference to intertemporal law, as under this rule facts have to be judged by
their contemporary standards. The following analysis wishes to examine how
the common law doctrine proposes new readings on this relationship between
law and history by inviting judges to decide on indigenous peoples’ land rights
based on their interpretation of historical events.
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50 N Pearson, ‘The Concept of Native Title at Common Law’ in Yunupingu (n 11).
51 For an illustration, see Supreme Court of Canada, Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1997)
3 SCR 1010.
52 Lamer CJ in R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 50, para 50.
A. Intertemporal law and ‘continuing violation’
When dealing with arguments of an historical nature one of the legal difficul-
ties is the inherent limitation of intertemporal law. In the words of Judge
Huber in the Island of Palmas arbitration ‘a juridical fact must be appreciated
in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not the law in force at the time
when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled’.53 Under the doctrine
of intertemporal law it is a well established legal rule that legal arguments
should be assessed in the light of the rules of law that are contemporary with
it.54 Hence, it is not possible for courts to look at past dispossession by using
contemporary norms on indigenous peoples’ land rights. However, if one
looks carefully at the rule of intertemporal law and the often-quoted case of
the Island of Palmas, there is another aspect to the doctrine. In the 1928 arbi-
tration case, Judge Huber stated:
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive
periods is to be applied in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a
distinction must be made between the creation of rights and the existence of
rights. The same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in
force at the time the right arises, demands that the existence of the right, in other
words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the
evolution of law.55
As Elias pointed out, the first element of the rule, that acts should be judged
in the light of the law contemporary with their creation, is widely accepted in
international law.56 However, the second element, the reference to ‘continued
manifestation’, remains controversial.57 The reference to continuous manifes-
tation means that an act should be also judged having regard to the evolution
of the law.
Applied in an indigenous peoples’ land rights context the rule of intertem-
poral law seems to indicate two contradictory directions. In many ways the
situation that indigenous peoples are facing today when it comes to land rights
is the result of dispossession that took place in the past under theories of
dispossession such as terra nullius, conquest or discovery. Thus, on the one
hand, the rule suggests that such dispossession could be regarded as perfectly
legal, as in most situations the reference to the rules of conquest, discovery or
terra nullius were perfectly legal in this period of history. It is only under
contemporary standards that they are illegal. This understanding of the rule
would regard most of the dispossession that took place during the colonial era
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as legal.58 Yet, on the other hand, the rule of intertemporal law suggests that
such acts of dispossession should also be appreciated in the light of the evolu-
tion of the law. And in many ways it could be argued that this is exactly what
the common law doctrine on indigenous title is doing.
For example, the doctrine of terra nullius has been judged inadequate under
contemporary legal standards on racial discrimination by the High Court of
Australia. As the majority affirmed in the Mabo judgment, the international
law notion that inhabited land may be classified as terra nullius no longer
commands general support; hence: ‘it is imperative in today’s world that the
common law should neither be nor be seen to be frozen in an age of racial
discrimination’.59 The references to ‘continued manifestation’ and ‘evolution
of the law’ under the intertemporal law doctrine could have far-reaching
consequences when applied to indigenous peoples’ land rights, as in many
cases the contemporary situation that indigenous peoples are facing is a direct
consequence of the laws of colonization. Because the consequences of such a
legacy are still at the centre of indigenous peoples’ dispossession, it is possi-
ble to maintain that such rules of dispossession should be put in perspective
with contemporary human rights law, in the sense that international law deals
with past wrongs as long as they have current, ongoing effects, or as MacKay
explains, with ‘past and ongoing wrongs’, as ‘a past violation may have ongo-
ing and continuing effects that are presently justiciable’.60
International institutions have acknowledged the ongoing and continuing
effects of past wrongs on the contemporary situations faced by indigenous
peoples. The reference to ‘continuous manifestation’ can be found in the
jurisprudence of several international bodies dealing with indigenous peoples’
rights. In the Lovelace case the Human Rights Council (HRC) was asked to
adjudicate on a fact that took place in 1970, thus before the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) entered into force. Even
though the HRC pointed out that it could not examine allegations relating to
events that had taken place before the entry into force of the Covenant, it
determined its competence in the case based on the notion of ‘continuing
effect’. The HRC stated: ‘[T]his fact persists after the entry into force of the
Covenant, and its effects have to be examined without regard to their original
cause’.61 More specifically, regarding indigenous peoples’ land rights, in the
case of Ominayak v Canada, the Committee concluded that the historical
inequity of the failure to assure the Lubicon Lake Band land ownership
through reservation threatened their way of life and constituted a violation of
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Article 27. The Committee stated: ‘[H]istorical inequities to which the State
party refers, and certain more recent developments, threaten the way of life
and culture of the Lubicon Lake Band, and constitute a violation of Article 27
so long as they continue’.62 What was decisive in Ominayak was that a series
of incremental adverse events could together constitute a ‘historical inequity’
which amounted to a violation of Article 27. While the mandate of the HRC
does provide for inquiries into past events that took place before ratification
by the State Party, the HRC has shown that past wrongs could constitute a
continuous violation of the contemporary rights enjoyed by indigenous
peoples under the ICCPR.63
This reference to historical inequities is not limited to the HRC; the
International Labour Organization (ILO) Committee which receives represen-
tation regarding the implementation of ILO Convention 169 at national level
has also dealt with arguments of an historical nature.64 In a case filed by the
Radical Trade Union of Metal and Associated Workers on behalf of the
Chinantec indigenous community in Mexico, one of the legal issues was that
the displacement of the concerned indigenous community from their land took
place before Mexico’s ratification of ILO 169. The Government of Mexico
challenged the Committee’s competence in examining events that took place
before Mexico’s ratification. The ILO Committee stated:
. . . the effects of the decisions that were taken at that time continue to affect the
current situation of the indigenous peoples in question, both in relation to their
land claims and to the lack of consultations to resolve those claims. The
Committee therefore considers that the Convention does currently apply with
respect to the consequences of the decisions taken prior to its entry into force.65
The Committee adopted a similar position in a decision against Denmark when
it stated: ‘the effects of the 1953 relocation continue today, in that the relocated
persons cannot return to the Uummannaq settlement and that legal claims to
those lands remain outstanding’.66 Accordingly, the Committee decided:
. . . that the consequences of the relocation that persist following the entry into
force of Convention No. 169 still need to be considered with regard to Articles
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14(2) and (3), 16(3) and (4) and 17 of the Convention, examined below, despite
the fact that the relocation was carried out prior to the entry into force of the
Convention.67
This position has been affirmed in other cases brought to the ILO
Committee.68 A similar approach has been followed by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, which in the case of Mary and Carrie Dann
affirmed that to the extent that the concerned indigenous peoples remain the
victims of ‘an on-going violation of their rights’, then the State is obliged to
resolve the situation in light of its contemporary obligations under interna-
tional human rights law.69 Likewise, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has established a doctrine of ‘continuing violation’, allowing the judge
to examine historical events that have consequences for indigenous peoples’
contemporary rights under the Inter-American Convention.70 Thus, even
though international human rights bodies such as the HRC or the Inter-
American Commission as well as the ILO Committee would not directly
address past dispossession, they would take into consideration the historical
inequities that led to the situation facing indigenous peoples. The rationale is
based on a link between historical dispossession and the present situation;
therefore, it could be deduced that human rights bodies and courts would not
address past dispossession unless it is linked with a present violation. In the
case of indigenous peoples’ land rights it means that the indigenous commu-
nity must still have a link with its territory. The community claiming a right to
the land should still exercise some form of occupation of the land. The
doctrine of continuous violation or past ongoing violations would only allow
courts or monitoring bodies the examination of past dispossession in the light
of present-day occupation by indigenous peoples, but would not allow a total
revision of past dispossession.
This focus on present-day occupation of the lands is also reflected in the
common law doctrine. Under the doctrine on indigenous title, indigenous
peoples’ right to their land would be recognized by national jurisdictions to the
extent that indigenous communities have survived dispossession and still live
on parts of their lands. In other words courts look at present-day occupation
only. In Mabo the High Court set down the requirement that there must be
‘substantial maintenance of the connection’ between the people and the land.
Exploring the criteria of present-day occupancy in Australia, Reilly pointed
out that ‘the main practical significance of Mabo was that it left open the
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possibility that to the extent indigenous communities have survived dispos-
session from their land, they possess a title to the land based on their tradi-
tional laws and customs’.71 As the author concluded, indigenous title ‘protects
what remains of the unique relationship to land of the indigenous peoples’.72
Likewise, as Lehmann points out, even though the requirement of present-day
occupation is not explicitly affirmed in Canadian jurisprudence, it seems clear
that the doctrine of aboriginal title would offer protection to present relation-
ships with the land.73 For example, in the Delgamuukw case the Supreme
Court of Canada insisted that one of the crucial criteria to establish aboriginal
title is that the community has maintained a substantial connection between
the people and the land.74 Thus, even though the courts would receive
evidence of past occupation through indigenous customs, physical occupation
of the land by the indigenous community is a fundamental criterion to recog-
nize their title. Lehmann sees this point as the principal limit to the application
of the doctrine in South Africa. She wrote:
The most serious limitation on the doctrine as a form of redress, is the fact that
the doctrine protects only existing relationships with land, relationships that exist
by virtue of the fact that at the time the colonising power asserted sovereignty,
the claimant group was in occupation of the particular territory claimed, and by
virtue of the fact that the claimant group has remained in occupation of that terri-
tory to the present day.75
This statement highlights how the doctrine does not address the situation of
indigenous communities that have been forcibly removed from their lands as
they would not fulfil the criteria of occupancy. In other words, the doctrine
does not address the issue of restitution for past dispossession. Nonetheless, as
stated above, the doctrine tries to establish a bridge between the past and the
present through its recognition of indigenous peoples’ own customary laws
and its reference to indigenous traditions over their lands and territories.
Hence, while the common law doctrine also relies on the limitation of present-
day occupation, it goes further than international law by proposing a much
more comprehensive legal theory on the relationship between indigenous
traditional customary systems of laws and contemporary land claims.
B. From ‘frozen rights’ to ‘cultural continuity’
Indigenous title is based on the existence of pre-existing customary indigenous
laws. The recognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights relies on proof that
the indigenous community has maintained a ‘traditional’ use of its lands
throughout the centuries. National courts have put the burden of proof on
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indigenous peoples to prove the contemporary existence of their traditional
law. Hence, one of the difficulties in applying the doctrine of indigenous title
is its reference to tradition. This reference to ‘traditional ways of using the
land’ could be seen as extremely static, as a strict interpretation means that
indigenous peoples have to use their land in the way they did centuries ago.
This position is often referred to as the ‘frozen rights’ approach, as under this
theory indigenous peoples’ right to land would be evaluated on whether or not
the concerned indigenous community has maintained a way of life which was
the same prior to colonization. This means that indigenous peoples would be
granted the right to use and occupy their lands only if they conform to tradi-
tional laws and customs; if such practices have evolved, their rights over lands
would not be recognized. The legal challenge is to appreciate whether a tradi-
tional use of the land has been observed continually since colonization.
While this issue has been touched upon at the international level, the legal
theory on the relationship between traditional use of land and contemporary land
claims remains limited. The most developed analysis on this issue comes from
the Human Rights Committee (HRC). The HRC has developed a cultural
approach to indigenous peoples’ land rights through Article 27 of the ICCPR. In
its General Comment on Article 27 the Committee stated:
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article 27, the
Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a partic-
ular way of life associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of
indigenous peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as fishing or
hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law.76
This reference to traditional activities was delineated in a case concerning the
Saami community in Finland, where the Committee stated that 
article 27 does not only protect traditional means of livelihood of national minori-
ties, as indicated in the State party’s submission. Therefore, that the authors may
have adapted their methods of reindeer herding over the years and practice it with
the help of modern technology does not prevent them from invoking article 27 of
the Covenant.77
Likewise, in a case concerning fishing rights in New Zealand, the HRC
confirmed this approach. It stated: ‘The right to enjoy one’s culture cannot be
determined in abstracto but has to be placed in context. In particular, article 27
does not only protect traditional means of livelihood of minorities, but allows
also for adaptation of those means to the modern way of life and ensuing tech-
nology’.78 The Committee clearly recognized that the cultural protection
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offered under Article 27 was not to be seen as ‘frozen’ as it also protects indige-
nous peoples’ contemporary use of their lands. For example, the use of heli-
copters for reindeer herding or the use of modern-day fishing technology by
indigenous peoples would not preclude them from their cultural rights protected
under Article 27 of the ICCPR. The indigenous community would still have to
prove that the activity is part of their traditional way of life, but not in a frozen
rights manner, as such activity could have evolved over the centuries.
This connection between traditional use of a territory and land rights is
central to the common law doctrine on indigenous title, for indigenous title is
based on the recognition of indigenous peoples’ pre-existing use of their lands.
In Canada, to be recognized as an aboriginal right, an indigenous practice must
be integral to the distinctive culture asserting the right, and such practice must
be persisting today. This test of ‘continuity’ demands that indigenous peoples
prove the ‘traditional’ aspect of their practice.79 Yet the Supreme Court has
rejected a frozen approach. For example, an aboriginal right to fish and hunt
has been recognized as belonging to a community using nylon nets and high-
powered rifles.80 Regarding aboriginal title, the Supreme Court ruled that
aboriginal title to land should allow aboriginal peoples to exercise their way
of life in a contemporary manner. In the Delgamuukw case the Supreme Court
adopted the view that aboriginal title should not be seen as frozen in time,
since it encompasses the use and occupancy of the land for a variety of
purposes.81 However, Chief Justice Lamer added that:
. . . lands subject to aboriginal title cannot be put to such uses as may be irrec-
oncilable with the nature of the occupation of that land and the relationship that
the particular group has had with the land which together have given rise to
aboriginal title in the first place.82
As pointed out by McNeil, the Supreme Court imposed an ‘inherent limit’
on aboriginal title.83 Chief Justice Lamer stated that if the aboriginal peoples
‘wish to use their lands in a way that aboriginal title does not permit, then they
must surrender those lands and convert them into non-title lands to do so’.84
Nonetheless, despite such limitations, the Canadian legal system has usually
adopted what Connolly calls a ‘legal doctrine of change’.85 As the author
highlights: ‘according to this doctrine, some degree of change in the content of
an indigenous practice over the period of time since colonisation does not
render that practice ineligible for legal recognition and protection’.86 Under
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the legal doctrine of change, the legal institutions have opted for a ‘dynamic
right’ approach towards indigenous customs. As Justice L’Heureux-Dube
stated in Van der Peet:
The most appreciable advantage of the ‘dynamic right’ approach to defining the
nature and extent of aboriginal rights is the proper consideration given to the
perspective of aboriginal people on the meaning of their existing rights. It recog-
nizes that distinctive aboriginal culture is not a reality of the past, preserved and
exhibited in a museum, but a characteristic that has evolved with the natives as
they have changed, modernized and flourished over time, along with the rest of
Canadian society.87
As the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw also stressed,
imposing the requirement of continuity too strictly would risk ‘perpetuating
the historical injustices suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonis-
ers who failed to respect aboriginal rights to land’.88 As Chief Justice Lamer
stated ‘the evolution of practices, customs and traditions into modern forms
will not  . . . prevent their protection as aboriginal rights . . . provided that
continuity with pre-contact practices, customs and traditions is demon-
strated’.89 This reference to continuity has to be seen as one of the core issues
in determining aboriginal title.
Likewise, this reference to continuity is one of the key elements in deter-
mining native title in Australia. On the issue of continuity, the case of the Yorta
Yorta community is often seen as a turning point for its reference to the ‘tide of
history’. In his decision at first instance, Olney J rejected the claim from the
members of the Yorta Yorta community on the main ground that there was not
enough evidence proving that the concerned indigenous community had contin-
ued to observe and acknowledge ‘the traditional laws and customs in relation
to land of their forbears’.90 As the judge concluded: ‘The tide of history has
indeed washed away any real acknowledgement of their traditional laws and
any real observance of their traditional customs’.91 In this case before the High
Court of Australia, the judges rejected the claim of the indigenous community
as the observance of traditional law and custom have not been continuous since
the establishment of sovereignty by the British over Australia in 1788. As
Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ pointed out, only the laws and customs
which existed ‘before the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown’ are to
be regarded as authentically traditional for the purposes of native title law.92
Explaining the meaning of ‘traditional’ the judgment states:
‘Traditional’ in this context must be understood to refer to the body of law and
customs acknowledged and observed by the ancestors of the claimants at the time
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of sovereignty [which must have] continued substantially uninterrupted. . . .
Were that not so, the laws and customs acknowledged and observed now could
not properly be described as traditional laws and customs of the people
concerned.93
As Reilly and Genovese point out, when an indigenous community claims
its rights to native title it has to prove first the existence of traditional laws and
customs in the past, secondly the observance of traditional laws and customs
in the present, and thirdly establish a connection between the two such that
laws and customs can be said to have been substantially maintained across
time.94 As the authors observe, the case of the Yorta Yorta community
‘permanently disrupted the assumption that law and history are able to speak
to each other’.95 Brennan comments on this decision:
On the one hand, the system of Aboriginal law and custom must demonstrate a
‘continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty’ (at [47] Gleeson CJ,
Gummow and Hayne JJ). Yet on the other hand, if that vitality has extended to
the generation of new social structures and new law and custom since 1788 to
take account of European colonisation, it seems it will surrender its ‘traditional’
character and forfeit the possibility of recognition by the judges of the colonis-
ing people (at [54] Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
In its 2005 concluding observations to Australia’s report under the
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) examined the consequences of the standard of proof
established in the Yorta Yorta community case. CERD expressed its concerns
‘about information according to which proof of continuous observance and
acknowledgement of the laws and customs of indigenous peoples since the
British acquisition of sovereignty over Australia is required to establish
elements in the statutory definition of native title under the Native Title Act’.
CERD pointed out that such a ‘high standard of proof required is reported to
have the consequence that many indigenous peoples are unable to obtain
recognition of their relationship with their traditional lands (Art 5)’. The
Committee recommended that the State Party review the requirement of such
a high standard of proof, bearing in mind the nature of the relationship of
indigenous peoples to their land. 96
Overall, there is a danger that by relying on the past, the indigenous title
doctrine relies too much on a specific legal translation of history. As Reilly
and Genovese note in the Australian context, ‘constructing native title in such
a way that they are required to exist in the same form outside of the time and
context of their creation is ahistorical . . . to interpose rights from the past into
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the present and expect their nature and extent to be unchanged requires a simil-
itude between conditions in the past and the present that gives a false notion
of history’.97 The authors raise doubt about the actual capacity of the doctrine
as a good vector between the past and the present by nature of its being too
metahistoric in its approach towards indigenous peoples’ own account of
history.98 By hinging too much on the past the doctrine seems to lose its cred-
ibility as a potential bridge between past dispossession and present-day occu-
pation. Moreover, the indigenous title doctrine shows dangerous signs of
adopting a one-sided approach to history, as the doctrine appears biased
against indigenous peoples’ forms of traditions and oral history. In determin-
ing indigenous title to land, judges rely on historical accounts (usually in their
written forms), and assume that such historical accounts tell the whole story
on how indigenous customary systems were in the past.
IV. ERASING THE PAST: EXTINGUISHMENT VERSUS HUMAN RIGHTS
Under the doctrine of indigenous title, an indigenous community would have
its collective title to the land recognized only if such historical title had not
been extinguished. Indigenous title could be explicitly extinguished by an act
whose purpose is the extinguishment of the title, or implicitly by an act that
creates a situation that would ultimately extinguish the title. The general rule
regarding extinguishment is that the legislative power should pass a valid act
that exhibits a clear and plain intention to extinguish indigenous title.99 The
requirement of a plain and clear legislative intention is a common feature of
most of the jurisdictions recognizing indigenous title.100 The legislature’s
intention would be determined by an objective test as the intention has to be
found in the words of the act itself and not in the state of mind of the legisla-
tors.101 However, the practice of extinguishment raises several questions
regarding fundamental international legal human rights standards on equality
and non-discrimination, as extinguishment only affects indigenous peoples.
Extinguishment also raises some issues regarding indigenous peoples’ right to
participation in decisions affecting them, as the legislature can potentially
extinguish indigenous peoples’ right over their lands without consultation with
the concerned communities.
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A. Equality and non-discrimination
The procedures concerning extinguishment of indigenous title raise questions
regarding the norms of equality and non-discrimination. Because indigenous
title is a title only recognizable to indigenous peoples, in return the procedures
surrounding its extinguishment are also specific to indigenous peoples. No
other title to land is susceptible to being extinguished. Indigenous title is
extremely vulnerable as it could extinguish by the legislative or executive
power ‘in circumstances where other titles to land are not’.102 Only indigenous
title is at risk of being extinguished, hence such procedures do create specific
norms that could be seen to be in violation of the principles of equality and
non-discrimination. Moreover, the notion of extinguishment raises some
issues regarding equality and non-discrimination as indigenous title is subor-
dinated to the rights of third parties. Extinguishment makes indigenous title a
very vulnerable right for indigenous peoples as their land rights could be
extinguished under pressure from third-party interest in their lands. As McNeil
points out, in Canada and Australia aboriginal or native title is extremely
vulnerable to the creation of third-party interests by the Crown.103 For exam-
ple, in the 1992 Mabo decision the High Court of Australia held that pre-exist-
ing indigenous land rights would have been extinguished to the extent that
they were inconsistent with either a real property interest granted by the
Crown or any other form of appropriation and use of their lands by the Crown
prior to the enactment of the 1975 Racial Discrimination Act (Cth).104 Thus,
regarding rights in land, the court recognized that titles granted by the Crown
could potentially extinguish indigenous titles if they were inconsistent with
other titles granted by the Crown. Likewise, McNeil demonstrates how in the
Delgamuukw decision the Supreme Court of Canada ‘has prepared the way for
giving precedence to private interests by providing the Crown with broad
powers to infringe Aboriginal title, even for such purposes as agriculture,
forestry, and mining’.105 As this author observes, the application of different
standards between indigenous title and non-indigenous titles, with the former
having superiority over the latter, is certainly hindering the establishment of a
truthful reconciliation process.106 From this perspective, the common law
doctrine on indigenous title clearly creates a hierarchy regarding land rights
with indigenous peoples’ rights being subject to extinguishment by other non-
indigenous titles.
In her report on indigenous peoples and their relationship to land, UN
Special Rapporteur Erica Daes emphasized that extinguishment is a procedure
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applied only against indigenous peoples. She wrote: ‘Aboriginal title is
normally subject to complete extinguishment by the Government of the State,
without the legal protection and rights that in most countries protect the land
and property of citizens’.107 Thus, she noted that the concept of aboriginal title
is by itself discriminatory as ‘it provides only defective, vulnerable and infe-
rior legal status for indigenous land and resource ownership’.108
Extinguishment suppresses all the rights of indigenous peoples, even those of
occupation and the right to use their lands. Extinguishment is an act of total
and absolute confiscation with no recourse, which goes against the increasing
recognition in international law of the special and fundamental relationship
that indigenous peoples have with their lands. Matthew Coone, a Cree Grand
Chief, when addressing the Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples stated: ‘. . . the doctrine of terra nullius is being rejected as a racist
construct and a breach of human rights. Extinguishment is simply terra nullius
applied after the fact’. 109
However, even though extinguishment appears to be in contradiction with
the notion of equality and non-discrimination, this avenue has rarely been
examined by the UN treaty-monitoring bodies. Despite the fact that the fight
against discrimination and for equality is the ‘golden thread’ of international
legal human rights discourse, apart from a few exceptions, neither the HRC
nor the CERD have explicitly addressed the issue of extinguishment as regards
its compatibility with non-discrimination or equality. To date the UN commit-
tees have looked at extinguishment in precise context only. For example, in
the case of New Zealand, using its early-warning mechanism, CERD specifi-
cally expressed its concern regarding the impact on the 2004 legislation on the
Foreshore and Seabed,110 highlighting that ‘the legislation appears to the
Committee, on balance, to contain discriminatory aspects against the Mâori, in
particular in its extinguishment of the possibility of establishing Mâori
customary title over the foreshore and seabed…’.111 Likewise, the HRC has
commented on the practice of extinguishment in the context of treaty rights in
Canada.112 But overall, there is no clear analysis on the compatibility of the
practice of extinguishment with international norms on equality and non-
discrimination.
The most elaborate decision on this link between non-discrimination and
extinguishment comes from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
(IACHR), which has explored the relationship between the theory of extin-
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guishable indigenous title to territory and human rights in the case of Mary
and Carrie Dann v United States.113 In this case the petitioners, both members
of the Western Shoshone indigenous community, alleged that the US
Government had interfered with the use and occupation of their ancestral
lands, thus violating some of their rights guaranteed by the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The Government argued that ‘the
Danns and other Western Shoshone lost any interest in the lands in question in
1872 as a result of encroachment by non-Native Americans . . .’.114 The
Government contended that such extinguishment was confirmed by a decision
of the Indian Claims Commission that had concluded that Western Shoshone
title to land had been extinguished.115 However, the Danns contested the
extinguishment of their rights as discriminatory contrary to Article II of the
Declaration, which protects the right to equality before the law. The petition-
ers challenged the State assumption on extinguishment by asserting that the
Government had failed to protect their land rights by not according those
rights the same degree of protection that it provides for the protection of the
property rights of non-Indians.116 More specifically regarding the issue of
extinguishment by third party rights, the petitioners argued that the ‘gradual
encroachment by non-indigenous settlers, miners and others, constitutes a
non-consensual and discriminatory transfer of property rights in land away
from indigenous people who continue in possession of their land and in favour
of non-indigenous interests’.117 The Government maintained that the
concerned communities had lost any interest in the lands in question as a result
of this encroachment by non-native Americans, and that this determination
was properly made through proceedings before the Indian Claims Commission
(a quasi-judicial body established for the very purpose of determining Indian
land claims issues).118 For the IACHR, one of the crucial issues was to assess
whether any part of such property rights remained un-extinguished, notably
looking at the issue of equality.119 The Commission stated:
While the State has suggested that the extinguishment of Western Shoshone title
was justified by the need to encourage settlement and agricultural developments
in the western United States, the Commission does not consider that this can
justify the broad manner in which the State has purported to extinguish indige-
nous claims, including those of the Danns, in the entirety of the Western
Shoshone territory.120
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On this issue, the IACHR concluded ‘that the Danns have not been afforded
equal treatment under the law respecting the determination of their property
interests in the Western Shoshone ancestral lands, contrary to Article II of the
Declaration’.121 Even though the IACHR did not address the issue of whether
or not the indigenous peoples’ right of ownership had been completely extin-
guished, it set out the guideline that any process of extinguishment should be
in conformity with fundamental guarantees of equality before the law. In
reaching this conclusion, the IACHR also highlighted that the practice of
extinguishment raises some issues regarding the right of indigenous peoples to
participate in the determination of their claims to property rights.
B. Effective participation and free and informed consent
The practice of extinguishment usually relies on unilateral decisions from the
State’s authorities in which indigenous peoples have no say. As highlighted
above in the case of Mary and Carrie Dann, the IACHR has criticized US
policy on extinguishment violating the rights of indigenous peoples to be fully
informed and consulted in decisions affecting them. Based on Articles XVIII
(right to fair trial) and XXIII (right to property) of the American Declaration,
the Commission pointed out that States have an obligation
to ensure that any determination of the extent to which indigenous claimants
maintain interests in the lands to which they have traditionally held title and have
occupied and used is based upon a process of fully informed and mutual consent
on the part of the indigenous community as a whole.122
The onus is on the State to ensure that the whole concerned indigenous
community is informed and consulted before any decision regarding their
lands is made. While in this case the IACHR relied on the right to fair trial and
the right to property enshrined in the American Declaration (to which the US
is a party), this association between the practice of extinguishment and the
right for indigenous peoples to be fully informed and consulted opens the door
to a whole body of international law on indigenous peoples’ right to political
participation. Extinguishment may clearly be found to contravene the right to
participation of indigenous peoples in decisions affecting them in relation to
their lands and territories.
In its General Comment 23, the HRC affirmed that indigenous communi-
ties must have effective participation in decisions that affect the community,
especially where culture manifests itself in a particular way of life associated
with the use of land resources.123 In the Länsmann case, the HRC affirmed
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that when undertaking acts that might infringe indigenous peoples’ rights,
States have a duty to consult indigenous peoples.124 This indicates that poten-
tially the theory of unilateral, extinguishable native title could be seen as
contrary to the rights of indigenous peoples to participate in decisions affect-
ing their territories as enshrined in Article 27 of the ICCPR. Thus, even though
the HRC has not directly dealt with the issue of the legality of the doctrine of
the extinguishment of indigenous title to territory through its individual
complaints mechanisms, there are many ways by which indigenous peoples
could argue against such discriminatory acts. The dialogue between Canada
and the HRC through the monitoring procedures of the Committee shows
further interrelationship between rights enshrined in the ICCPR and the prac-
tice of extinguishment. In its 1999 concluding observations concerning the
report from Canada, the HRC recommended ‘that the practice of extinguish-
ing inherent Aboriginal rights be abandoned as incompatible with article 1 of
the Covenant’.125 Thus, the HRC established a clear link between self-deter-
mination and the practice of extinguishment, as self-determination implies a
right of the concerned people to participate in decisions affecting them. More
recently, in its 2006 concluding observations on Canada’s report, the HRC
pointed out that the practice of extinguishment in modern treaties between
aboriginal peoples and the Government raised some issues regarding Articles
1 and 27 of the ICCPR.126 Hence, overall the practice of extinguishment
engages indigenous peoples’ rights under the ICCPR which gives indigenous
peoples a right to participate in decisions affecting them.
This contradiction between the practice of extinguishment and international
standards on political participation is not limited to the ICCPR as several other
international instruments insist on indigenous peoples’ right to participation
and consultation in decisions affecting them. Under international law there has
been some debate on whether indigenous peoples do have a specific right to
effective participation which could be translated into a right to free and
informed consent to decisions affecting their lands.127 Article 16 of the ILO
Convention 169 clearly affirms that relocation of indigenous peoples from
their lands should take place only with their free and informed consent. The
whole spirit of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
adopted by the Human Rights Council is based on the notion of partnership
between indigenous peoples and States. The practice of extinguishment seems
particularly contrary to the idea of free and informed consent enshrined in
Article 32 of the declaration. CERD, in its General Recommendation XXIII,
Historical Indigenous Peoples’ Land Claims 607
124 Länsman v Finland, Communication No 511/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, para 9.5.
125 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, Canada, UN Doc
CCPR/C/79/Add.105, para 8 (1999).
126 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, Canada, UN Doc
CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, para 8 (2006).
127 eg see comments by the Government of Australia on the concluding observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc CERD/C/AUS/CO/14/Add.1
(2006).
pointed out that States Parties to ICERD have to ‘ensure that members of
indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of effective participation in
public life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests
are taken without their informed consent’.128 Decisions affecting indigenous
peoples’ land rights would certainly fall into this category of ‘decisions
directly affecting them’; hence States would have to make sure that any deci-
sions affecting indigenous peoples’ land rights would be taken with their free
and informed consent. In the same General Comment, CERD stated:
The Committee especially calls upon States parties to recognize and protect the
rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their communal
lands, territories and resources and, where they have been deprived of their lands
and territories traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited or used without their
free and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and territories.129
In its concluding observations to Australia’s report, CERD recommended that
Australia ‘make every effort to seek the informed consent of indigenous
peoples before adopting decisions relating to their rights to land’.130 CERD
has debated whether indigenous peoples’ right to free and informed consent
should grant them a right to veto decisions affecting their lands.131
Overall, despite the debates on whether indigenous peoples have a right to
free and informed consent that could provide them with a right of veto,132 the
practice of unilateral extinguishment appears to be in clear violation of the
right of indigenous peoples to effective participation in decisions directly
affecting them. In the near future, one could expect that international or
regional courts would be asked to litigate on whether the practice of extin-
guishment is consistent with international legal standards on effective partici-
pation and consultation. Such litigation would be a welcome step that would
shed light on the legality of extinguishment, which has been seen by many
indigenous communities as one of the last vestiges of the legacy of coloniza-
tion. For indigenous peoples, extinguishment is seen as an injustice that
assumes the superiority of the colonial legacy over their own legal traditions.
As Gèlè-Ahanhanzo, the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, pointed
out in his report following his 2001 visit to Australia, extinguishment remains
one of the issues which is altering the process of reconciliation with indige-
nous peoples. He concluded that indigenous peoples’ consent in matters relat-
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ing to their land rights was a necessary component of reconciliation in
Australia.133 This conclusion from the UN Special Rapporteur illustrates how
crucial it is for national courts and international jurisdictions to examine the
practice of extinguishment in the light of international standards on non-
discrimination and political participation. It is only based on such minimal
human rights standards that courts would be able to sow the seeds of a sustain-
able process of reconciliation. As such the practice of extinguishment raises
fundamental questions regarding the possibility of addressing past disposses-
sion from a legal perspective. The recourse to extinguishment relies on the
false idea that the past could simply be erased with some ‘legal trick’.
V. CONCLUSION
Going back to the central question which was raised in the introduction to this
article on whether the doctrine of indigenous title could serve as a potential
model on the interaction between historical wrongs and contemporary indige-
nous peoples’ land claims, it seems that the answer is not straightforward. By
entrenching present-day indigenous peoples’ land rights into their pre-existing
customary systems of law, the doctrine builds a bridge between historical
wrongs and the contemporary situation. To reconcile the past and the present,
national jurisdictions have relied on the idea of traditions, as indigenous
peoples have to prove that they have maintained a substantial traditional
connection with their territories. However, this process of reconciliation also
relies on the principle that only indigenous communities that are currently in
occupation of the land would have their right to land recognized, for national
courts limit their enquiries to present-day occupation. Thus, the indigenous
title doctrine does inquire into the past in the name of reconciliation. However,
in doing so it relies on a very scrupulous timing of the past as indigenous
peoples have to prove first that they are maintaining a traditional cultural
occupation of their lands, and secondly that this occupation has been continu-
ous.
Hence, on a theoretical level, the common law approach to indigenous title
seems to offer some functional and enforceable legal mechanisms on how to
adjudicate such historical claims. However, on a more practical level, this
bridge between the past and the present has been established on a controver-
sial foundation through reference to the notion of ‘extinguishment’.134 To
resolve the historical nature of indigenous peoples’ land rights, national courts
have established that indigenous title is an extinguishable right. Even though
the doctrine recognizes the pre-existence of indigenous customary laws, it
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does not expunge past dispossession, for it relies on the idea that once extin-
guished a land claim cannot be revived. As has been highlighted, the practice
of extinguishment potentially clashes with international human rights norms
on equality and political participation. Hence, while the doctrine brings some
crucial advancement regarding indigenous peoples’ land rights, such advance-
ment is seriously undermined by the reference to extinguishment.
Nevertheless, despite this important limitation, the common law doctrine
opens the door to another approach to the way we see law. Traditionally, law
has been developed in a very insular way, and with the introduction of other
customary systems of law in this normative system, the doctrine is totally
reshaping that system. The introduction of customary indigenous laws relying
on sources such as oral history or song will take time as overall it is an attempt
to integrate into the common law a system of indigenous laws which rely on
completely different sources of laws. As such, the common law doctrine
certainly acts as a compelling model on how to accommodate national legis-
lation and indigenous customary systems of laws. This movement towards the
recognition of indigenous peoples’ own customary systems of land tenure is
an important step in the development of a legal theory on reconciliation. It
shows that to reconcile past historical dispossession with the contemporary
situation faced by indigenous peoples it is necessary to start by recognizing
indigenous peoples’ own systems of law.
Thus, despite all the limitations that were discussed throughout the article,
the common law doctrine appears as one of the most elaborate legal discus-
sions on the issue of reparation for past wrongs. As the common law doctrine
illustrates, indigenous land-claim title raises fundamental issues about the
legal repercussions of colonization, about the nature of State land, and about
the extent to which it is permissible to distinguish between one group of
people and another on ethnic grounds. Whereas this issue generates some
significant political and societal choices, the message stemming from the
national jurisdictions is that the issue of land restitution and land distribution
between non-indigenous and indigenous populations is also a question of
justice and not only one of politics. In many ways, the movement towards a
comprehensive doctrine on indigenous title is part of what Slaughter has
termed ‘judicial globalization’.135 Indigenous peoples’ land rights are an area
of international law in constant development and in which there is a high level
of interaction between national laws and international law.136 The rights that
indigenous peoples have under international law are partly a product of land-
mark decisions taken at the national level. Each of these test cases contributes
to what is a continuously evolving area of international law. The doctrine of
indigenous title could serve as a potential model in the Commonwealth, but
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also in other legal systems. Moreover, the acknowledgment of the doctrine as
a source of law by countries with a significant indigenous population such as
Kenya, Botswana, Guyana or Malaysia could serve as a positive force in the
movement towards the development of a stronger corpus of international law
regarding indigenous peoples’ land rights. As illustrated by the debates that
led to the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
by the Human Rights Council, many initiatives are stopped because of States’
reluctance to recognize indigenous peoples’ historical rights over their
lands.137 From this perspective it is certain that the expansion of the doctrine
of indigenous title, which clearly recognizes the historical basis of indigenous
peoples’ right to land, could serve as an enlightening way to resolve the debate
on the relationship between historical dispossession and contemporary land
claims.
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